One reason, I said, is that the different way in which the two assemblies apply these procedures or not stems from the differences in stature and influence between the U.S. congressional committees and the Australian parliamentary committees, even in the Senate of Canberra, with the relatively active role of their committees in the revision of legislation. U.S. congressional committees tend to write bills that the House of Representatives and Senate are considering, and their members often direct and dominate the process of debating and amending these bills in the Houses of Representatives and Senate chambers. It therefore seems natural that the competent committees of both chambers should take the lead in securing bicameral agreements and, historically, conference committees have created a forum for this to be done precisely. On the other hand, in Canberra and even in the Senate, committees can be valuable, but ultimately less decisive, players in the development of legislation than their counterparts in Washington. It would therefore be much less logical and appropriate for Parliament to rely on a bicameral resolution mechanism that could be a natural extension of its Senate and parliamentary committees. In the end, what was in the Constitution was a modified form of that plan. Speaking at the Details Committee, Franklin added that the revenue bills come from the House of Representatives. As such, the Senate would give the government a federal character, not because senators were elected by state legislators, but because each state was represented in the same way.
Both Parliament and Congress have responded by leaving room for their rules and constant injunctions, both for individual and collective approaches to resolving their differences. Their rules are obviously not the same and we are not waiting. Thus, congressional rules are more explicit and detailed with respect to substantive agreements that conferences can present to the House of Representatives and the Senate in their reports. And parliamentary rules are clearer when it comes to conferences (the collective approach), when dependence on the individual approach has proved fruitless. However, such differences in formal procedures are blurring from the main difference in practice I have described: Congress would find it difficult to do its job without the use of conference committees; Parliament does not do that. Although a small fraction of the new U.S. laws are the result of conference committees, Congress has relied on such commissions to resolve bicameral differences of opinion on many of the largest and most complex bills passed by both chambers, and it will likely continue to do so despite the recent political and procedural developments I have described. Parliament has launched only two conferences since the Federation and shows no propensity to change practice. The other sections of Article I detail how Congress should be formed and managed. The first part, as we have read above, makes our Congress in two chambers.
Two chambers mean that Congress has two houses: the House of Representatives and the Senate. We have both houses of Congress through a compromise that the founding fathers made during the Constitutional Convention. Delegates from the Constitutional Convention, from larger and more populous states, voted in favor of the Virginia plan, which called for representation of Congress on the basis of a state`s population. Fearing supremacy, delegates from small states also supported equal representation and supported New Jersey`s plan, which proposed that each state have one vote, regardless of population. Roger Sherman, a delegate from Connecticut, proposed the bicameral legislative structure. The Great Compromise, along with some other provisions, led to the creation of two houses, with representation based on the population in one (the House of Representatives) and equal representation in the other (the Senate).